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If one claims to have knowledge based upon a reli­
gious experience, must they belong to a specific religion to 
have that experience? More importantly, must they have 
participated directly in that experience? These experiences 
may be an entirely normal human phenomenon, given that 
most have an understanding of /I a divine presence" or even 
"participation" in such an event) However, something so 
widely understood as II religious experience" falls short 
when a definition must be ascribed to it. Some may contend 
that a "religious" experience does not imply its origin in 
doctrinal or institutional religion.ii On the other hand, those 
that cling to religion often find that religion would be de­
prived (in most cases) of its most basic element if it did not 
at one time, or presently include what we call "religious ex­
perience". Arguably, in one degree or another, all experi­
ences that support the basis of religion are considered onto­
logically to be of rnystical quality.iii It is the personal quality 
of mystical experiences that will be explored in the pages 
that follow. 
The American philosopher and pragmatist, William 
James, had significant thIngs to say regarding mystical ex­
perience in his work TIle Varieties of Religious Experience 
(VRE). In reference to the above discussion, he felt that the 
moving force behind religion was not found in the creeds, 
dogmas or elaborate descriptions of religions, but: 
What keeps religion going is something [ ... ] [other] 
than abstract definitions and systems of concate­
nated adjectives, and something different from fac- . 
ulties of theology [ ... ]. These things are the after­
effects, secondary accretions upon those phenom­
ena of vital conversation with the unseen divine 
1...] renewing themselves [ ... Jin the lives of hurn­
bIe private men (VRE 487). 
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What he means here is that these "secondary things" are 
dependent upon this dialogical connection that, as he defines 
it, happens in a mystical experience. 
Looking at his epistemology in general will be im­
portant to gain the proper understanding of mystical ex­
perience in Varieties. In this essay, I first trace this epistemo­
logical development in the later works of Pragmatism (P) 
and the posthumously published Essays of Radical Empiri­
cism (ERE). Then, I examine whether he remains consistent 
after applying the findings from his epistelTIology to the 
metaphysical dimension he holds of religious experience. 
Finally, after leaving behind James's idea that religious ex­
perience remains only authoritative for the individual, I 
will defend my position that this does not entail mystical 
experience is less verifiable and applicable to a collective 
whole. From comparisons of our own and others' religious 
experiences and th.e role of cognitive feeling within them, 
this may be a case of what I term "pluralistic knowledge"­
an intersubjective knowledge that makes a practical differ­
ence to more than one individual's life. SOlne ideas from 
contemporary philosophers Richard Rorty and Bruce Wil­
shire will help illuminate the details of cognitive feeling, 
and the social community that this pluralism depends on. 
I: An Inherited Religious Tendency 
Who was !:his man William James, and why as a 
pragmatist, was he concerned with religion? Th.e innova­
tion he brought regarding pragmatism was to see it as a 
method applied to moral, metaphYSical and religiousprob­
lems regarding uses of truth and value, rather than just a 
method of scientific inquiry into the meaning of ideas. The 
first American pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce, embod­
ied the latter idea in his pragmatism, and became put off by 
the ideas of James, and henceforth diverged from James 
calling his own pragmatism, "pragmaticism" - a name he 
said was /I ugly enough [ ... ] to be safe from kidnap­
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pers" (Thayer 88). In James's work Pragmatism, he describes 
the results of this wider inquiry as freeing us 1/from abstrac­
tion and insufficiency, from fixed principles, closed sys­
tems, and pretended absolutes and origins" (51). 
Throughout James's early life, he struggled with the 
notion that human thought and action was determined, and 
humans might be thus forced to act mechanically in a 
closed universe (Thayer 133). His father, Henry James was 
a religious man, having studied extensively at Princeton 
Theological Seminary, and he instilled in James a democ­
ratic way of viewing religious impulses (VRE v). Later in 
life, James fulfilled a promise to his father that someday he 
would deal critically with the issue of religion by writing 
the comprehensive work The Varieties ofReligious Experience, 
where the focus of religion would be placed not on the ob­
ject (Le., God), but on the subject as an experiencing, believ­
ing, doubting, and praying person (VRE vii). 
Although James did not consider himself to be a di­
reet participant in mystical experience,lv he says in a letter 
to a friend that his purpose in writing the Varieties was to 
show the glue holding the world's religious life together. 
Furthermore, he wanted to show that the function of the life 
(Le., those things found within the religious experiences) of 
religion was mankind's most important oneY So how did 
James define mystical experience, and what did experience 
mean to him in general? These two components of his epis­
temology must be explored. 
II: Experience: Mystical and Mundane 
For James l there are four qualities that accompany 
mystical experiencevi and the resulting conditions he placed 
on these experiences. The first quality is ineffability; that is, 
it "defies expression" and a wholly adequate articulation is 
impossible. Second, it is noetic, or a state of knowledge, and 
we gain things from this experience. A third is transiency­
the experience does not last long, but passes away quickly. 
FinallYI it is passive, or the feeling of union where one is ac­
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tually "grasped" or "held" by a superior power. The condi­
tion James places on mystical experience is its authority for 
only those individuals who have it (VRE 414-15). 
In SOlne of James's later works, the mindset he used 
to view experience and what he termed"experiences" un­
folds for us. In radical empiricism, James explainS experi­
ences within the flux of time as being within "a world of 
pure experience./I This world of pure experience is a world 
of "pure objects" in which things can only be identified as a 
/I that" or a "datum, fact, phenomenon, or con­
tent" (McDermott 227). In order for an object (say, a book) 
to be classified as more than a "that," but also as "physical" 
or a 1/ percept" of something else it must have a function 
(i.e., it can be read). When a particular object (the book) 
within experience is seen with and then obscured from the 
eyes, it can be thought of as "having been," or existing in 
past experiences and is thus a percept. In addition to this, 
taken in totality, my experiencing the book is what it is "to 
be conscious of something" .vii 
Thus, James shows us in the world of pure experi­
ence, objects have three ontological states. First, they have 
their 11 pure" form, or "as they are" and can be referred to 
only as a "that" and without content. Secondly, as things 
move within space and time, they become divided into 
what they have been, are, and will be.vii Finally, these rela­
tions are conscious, given they are inseparable from the cog­
nitive element of experience, and that acquisition of a con­
scious quality depends upon its having a context. 
Given these examples and analyses, the tendency for 
Jmnes to emphasize the cognitive relation connecting things 
within experience should be evident, and that in cases 
where there are cognitive relations, these are as much ex­
periences as the objects that they connect.iX Carrying the 
cognitive aspect of radical empiricism further, one may 
claim the importance of the personal feeling that gives mys­
tical experience its individual quality.x In any event, the is­
sue raised here by James's radical empiricism concerns the 
subjectivity of experience. This arises because the subjective 
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qualities of these experiences are inevitably determined by 
the limitations of that particular person's perceptions and 
sensations. 
Similarly, James mentions repeatedly the importance 
of cognitive states in his Pragmatism lectures. The cognitive 
function of feeling arises when things are evaluated by their 
1/ cash-value", or by the practical difference they make. 
Things are useful to us insofar as we value them. This use­
ful value is determined by what our belief (i.e., the response 
to our feelings) about these things may entail.xi Cognition is 
defined as the action or faculty of knowing taken in its wid­
est sense, including sensation, perception, memory and 
judgment. In Pragmatism, James uses an example of being 
lost and starving in the woods, and seeing a cow-path. It is 
reasonable, he says, to believe that there may be some hu­
man habitation beyond the path, for this may mean saving 
oneself from starvation. Thus, the inclinations given to this 
experience by sensations with the eyes had great implica­
tions for one's life and future well being: namely, the practi­
cal relevance of believing there is a human habitation be­
yond that path (P 93-5). We can see for ourselves that this 
feeling, or impulse to act on our belief would have implica­
tions important to our life, even though we would only be 
acting on the probability that there was something beyond 
that path. James elaborates on implications of individual 
belief somewhat further: 
If there be any life better we should lead, and if 
there be any idea which, if believed in, would help 
us to lead that life, then it would be really better for 
us to believe in that idea, unless indeed, belief in it 
incidentally clashed with other greater vital bene­
fits (37). 
Thus, the significance placed on individual belief, es­
pecially in religious tone, cannot be separated from the cog­
nition of sensuous experience. It is therefore not unruly for 
James to say that "pragmatism, so far from keeping her 
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eyes bent on the immediate practical foreground, [... ] 
dwells just as much upon the world's remotest perspec­
tives" (56). 
Note he is willing to include religious experience, yet 
in a tone that is not monistic in quality. xii The religious plural­
ism he wants to account for is an open-ended system; one guided 
by empirically verified hypotheses (73-4). Even more so, in reli­
gious life the notion holds true that: 
We can and we may, as it were, jump with both feet 
off the ground into or towards a world of which we 
trust the other parts to meet our jump - and only so 
can the making of a perfected world of the plural­
istic pattern ever take place (McDermott 740). 
Thus, the full experience for James consists in intri­
cate cognitive connections that present the world as mostly 
unified or held together by the plurality of experiences of 
others, as well as our own. 
III: Empirical Verification Applied to Mystical Experience 
With these things in mind, I would like to sugges t 
the'lt James's epistemological development seems to sh.ow, 
prima jacie, a consistent residue from his earlier account of 
religious experience in Varieties. xiii However, he fails to re­
main consistent when holding that the metaphysics of mys­
tical experience are only possibly verifiable by scientific 
methods because this assumption goes beyond his praglna­
tism, given he holds the practical benefits of mystical ex­
perience are private, and carmot be shared to a community. 
I would like to show that his view of religion has more 
similarities to radical empiricism by looking into his con­
cept of IIquasi-chaos" and then seeing the working cogni­
tive aspect within experience which allows us to know and 
identify mystical experiences of others. These are isstles I . 
will return to later in my discussion of pluralistic knowl­
edge. 
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In both Pragmatism and Varieties James insists that the 
value placed upon religious mystical experience is not only 
real but also true for those who have them, and are a possi~ 
bility for greater truths beyond current scientifically verified 
empirical data. Regarding scientific knowledge, he asks us, 
why not think that perhaps our own, or others' mystical ex­
periences are not the beginning of a 11 transition" in the total 
human experience? It is likely that what James really meant 
by saying mystical experience was potentially scientifically 
verifiable, was that it could be evidence providing insight 
into new knowledge thafs becoming more II scientifically 
verifiable", but not necessarily "verified" at this point in 
time. 
Where I diverge from James is the point at which he 
discusses another problem with the scientific verification of 
mystical experiences, saying that science tends to focus 
more on creating "entities" or If universal laws" that will 
work regardless of situation, or personal feeling. James 
rnight be trying to a void an appeal to the monism of scien­
tific rationalism here, or that a particular religious union 
with a greater power will make an immediate practical dif­
ference in more than one person l s life. The latter conception 
is impossible, because mystical experiences for James are 
fundamentally subjective, and authoritative only for that 
individuaL My disagreement is that two or more person's 
"knowledge" about mystical experiences of others might 
not require their being verifiable and arguable-and this is 
contrary to science. 
He seems unaware of having set up the case here, by 
his naming it the "science of religions", for a knowledge 
one can immediately obtain from such experiences that 
should not be ignored since it has a possibility of being even­
tually verified. With this in mind, those who have not had 
mystical experiences should be able to grant from the ac­
counts of oth.ers their possible verification; and this at least 
provides them a general knowledge that such experiences 
indeed do 1/ exist" and are II out there l ! to be evaluated as 
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such. This now brings me to the notion of "pluralistic 
knowledge". 
IV: Pluralistic Knowledge 
It has been mentioned early on that, in stepping away 
from James's position regarding mystical experience, I 
wished to amplify what I call "pluralistic knowledge". I 
will begin by first examining, in order, James's concept 
N quasi-chaos", degrees of mystical knowledge, and the in~ 
separable emotive and cognitive elements of mystical ex~ 
periencei finally I will discuss the pragmatic value of this 
knowledge. Although this notion may become clearer by 
sketching these things throughout the following pages, I 
continue to hold with James that mystical experience is val~ 
ued in society, but I think he failed to see this value is not 
dependent on its scientific verification.xiv 
The concept involved in II quasi-chaos"xv is that an in~ 
dividual may undergo an experience leading to an event X, 
while another may have an experience and also be led to X. 
However, the first individual may have employed meth­
ods, or experienced feelings of A and B to get to X, while 
the second employed or experienced C and D. So in short, 
differing paths may sometimes lead people to experience 
the same event. Hence, given the variety of experiences that 
are mystical throughout differing cultures and religions, 
this supports the claim that "there is vastly more 
[perceptual] discontinuity in the sum total of experience 
than we commonly suppose" (McDermott 204). 
If one claims to know something about an experience, 
it is assumed they must have knowledge of that experien­
tial content- either from their own experience, or of (m­
other individual's experience. But according to James's 
"quasi-chaos", we can have different experiences that lead to 
the same event. In mystical experience the abstract object 
(such as God) what my experience "points to". Con­
versely, my cognitive awareness, feel:i:ngs, thoughts, atti­
tude of the object, and sense of self to whom that attitude 
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belongs are what my experience consists of (VRE 542-3). 
The experiential events termed /I quasi-chaos" must there­
fore include supersensible or mystical experiences, and by 
doing so take into account a whole system of experience. 
Mystical experiences are real, sensible, and plural according 
to his notion of Ii quasi-chaos" . 
It was mentioned above that in order to know some­
thing, usually one must have knowledge of that subject's 
content.xvi The noetic quality in mystical experience th.ere­
fore is the awareness of the content of that experience. 
However, if we recall a principle from radical empiricism, 
an object has no content unless we are made IJconscious" by 
our recognition of it in continuous transition. In order for 
pluralistic knowledge to work here, the content must be 
made intersubjectively explicit to a group of individuals. 
From the concept of "quasi-chaos", we can have different 
experiences leading to the same event, so it's plausible to 
claim that our individual mystical experiences can differ, 
but not necessarily the object to which they refer (and they 
won't differ greatly, assuming the object(s) in mystical ex­
perience are all supersensible). 
Now, it seems obvious that if I have had a mystical 
experience, I needn't argue with myself whether Jknow the 
content of that experience. However, the problem for plu­
ralistic knowledge is how I can identify another as having 
had a valid mystical experience. How can t without being 
aware of the content they alone have, identify it as mysti­
cal? I would like to suggest that the solution to this problem. 
lies in the inherent cognitive feeling within mystical experi­
ence. We all know what it is to be conscious of something, 
and moreover, we know what it is to have a sensation, or 
emotional feeling for something, or for some object. It 
seems that the only condition for identifying what another 
knows; is to have knowledge of the content. But thejullnl!ss 
of that content one must have is not generally made an is­
sue.xvii With this point the definition of IImystical" can be 
broadened to relate to knowledge, of any degree, of what 
may be mystical, as a criterion for identifying whether an­
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other's experience was a mystical experience. Thus, because 
a mystical experience involves a cognitive feeling to'wards 
an object, it is plausible that everyone may possess the abil­
itv to identify \vhether another's experience was mysti­
cal.x\·iii 
Hmvever, since I may only have a small degree of the 
content to identify this experience as mystical, I cannot un­
derstand either the full sensibility of the other's experience 
or totalll1 understand the ineffability of that mystical experi­
~nce. In order for mystical experiences to be called 
"scientific" they would need to be fully describable, meas­
urable, and also repeatable (much as an experiment-Le., 
not transient). This is where I think James missed a funda­
mental point underlying mystical experiences: If they are 
currently not scientific, this doesn't imply that they can't be 
an intersubjectively knowable experience at least to a cer­
tain degree. Gathering from what we have seen above, an 
experience needn't be fully explicit to everyone to be 
known to others, and these religious experiences can still 
exist in a community in which they are known. The plural­
istic knowledge here is an intersubjective understanding of 
each other's possession of differing ways or paths of experi­
ence to a supersensible object. 
Pluralistic knowledge can also be understood by its 
similarities to the inseparable emotive and cognitive func­
tions from common phenomena in daily life that are inar­
guable in much the same way as I am claiming mystical ex­
periences can be. For example, one may not be able to de­
scribe or provide inferential reasons of their love for a hus­
band, wife, or family, but this does not mean that those ac­
quainted with them would deny the existence of this love. 
The concept of "being in love" in general (with God, a per­
son, etc.) may be incapable of description in terms of the 
character or actions of the beloved people or objects. Even 
more so, one would not undermine a child's love for their 
pet dog, an unconditional love for an imperfect person, or 
philanthropic desire to help others as unwarranted because 
of its ineffability. An insightful philosopher regarding this, 
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Richard Rorty, writes: 
It does not greatly matter whether we state our rea­
son to believe-our insistence that some or all finite 
mortal humans can be far more than they have yet 
become - -in religious, political, philosophical, liter­
ary, sexual, or familial terms. What matters [most] 
is [ ... ] the ability to experience overpowering hope Dr 
faith Dr love (Cambridge 97, italics mine). 
What Rorty is trying to suggest is that experiences we 
have may go beyond argument. He says later this may be 
because we presently have no way of describing them. This 
doesn't imply however, that they are not real to us or know­
able to others. More importantly, he stresses the insistence 
we have to believe our experiences are real that allows us to 
move forward in the flux of experience- to become what 
we are not yet-and, on my view, mystical experience is 
not excluded from this. 
Some pragmatic implications for such an acceptance 
of mystical experience are found in the possibility of hope 
and improvement of the quality of life, and the source of 
sllch possibilities for James is a supersensible realm of new 
experience. Although participating in someone else's mysti­
cal experience is impossible, /J sharing notes" with others 
about our own experiences cannot provide but a pluralistic 
way to help us understand better the supersensible reality 
we ourselves may have hope in. This interaction with oth­
ers in a community is vital to the sharing and growing of 
religious hope and a faith in what lies beyond this life. 
Pragmatically considered, here we find the heart of plural­
istic knowledge as applied to mystical experience. In an­
other place, Rorty says: 
A religious faith which seems to lie behind the at­
tractions of both utilitarianism and pragmatism is, 
instead, a faith in the future possibilities of mortal 
humans, a faith which is hard to distinguish from 
love for, and hope for, the human community (96). 
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This love, hope, and faith in the efforts of the human 
community are what Rortv terms "romance"-a romance. . 
underlining the notion that a pluralistic knowledge among 
individuals may ••• ] crystallize around a congregation,fI [ 
around a novel as easily as around a sacrament, around a 
God as easily as around a child (96). 
50 in essence a It romantic attitude" can help us un­
derstand the importance of a kno'wledge that is pluralistic 
in nature, yet binds humanity by the fact that our individ­
ual experiences have value applicable to the whole human 
enterprise. A social quality like this is, after alt the primary 
benefit of an anti-foundationalist epistemology that rejects 
all ready-made absolutes. This is further supported by an 
observation of James scholar Bruce Wilshire. He writes that 
1/[ ••. ] our experiencing is not completely private. To a great 
extent it is experienceable by others, and their experiencing 
infiltrates (sometimes floods) ours" (Cambridge 120). 
Moreover, in reminiscence of James's lifelong sh'ug­
gles with determinism, I think he would have agreed with 
'\Nilshire here that there is a need for recognition of the role 
of pluralistic or publicly attained knowledgei and also 
'when Wilshire continues to say that human viewpoints of 
the world are determined largely because as social crea­
tures, "[... ] thinking beings that get constituted within an 
experienceable world [ ... ] experience others experiencing 
them as experienced and experienceable (10). Perhaps it is 
not James's intelligence, but rather his human temporality 
that prevented him from furthering his philosophical per­
spectives to rest upon a view of pluralistic knowledge. 
V: Conclusion 
In tracing James's radical empiricist and pragmatist 
views in the course of this paper, I have tried to show the 
implications of these views when applied to mystical ex­
perience in Varieties. These implications have proven not so 
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clear-cut! however, given the complexities of James!s mean­
ing of experience. Nonetheless! I have maintained that al­
though James holds mystical experience compatible vdth 
eventual verification on scientific grounds, he did not see 
clearly enough that our knowledge from mystical states can 
currently be widened by dependence on humanity's collec­
tive effort of sharing knowledge and constant deliberation. 
IIPluralistic knowledgell is the term I have used to 
represent this collective effort of experiencing and intersub­
jectively identifying to one another the mutual relations of 
cognitive feeling inherent in all mystical experiences. In do­
ing this! we can pragmatically benefit by increasing our 
own knowledge of the supersensible by becoming con­
scious of that of other's. 
Moreover, with both a Jamesian-eye view, and from 
Rortis clever suggestion! the undertaking of a /I romantic 
attitude II towards pluralism allows us to see that mystical 
experience is valuable to humanity as a whole. I have 
hoped to show this as the result of acknowledging plural­
istic knowledge. Finally, with the suggestions of Wilshire, 
and James! s concern to incorporate his own strong reserva­
tions about determinism into his philosophy, we can see 
clearly that the pragmatic value and meaning of James!s 
reflections are worth bearing in mind. 
Notes 
i Contributor to this topic, Professor Ellen Kappy Suckiel of Notre Dame 
writes "r [...J begin with the modest and uncontroversial claim that a 
great many human beings have experienced feelings such as religious 
awe and wonder, and that having such feelings is an entirely normal 
mode of response.1I from "The Cognitive Value of Feelings", in Heavens 
Champion William James's Philosophy afReligion, p.73. 
ii I am borrowing the Deweyan distinction between "religion" and the 
"religious". According to Dewey, "Religion always signifies a special body of 
beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organization, loose or 
tight. The adjective religious denotes nothing ill the way of a specifiable entity, 
either institutional or as a system of beliefs. [Furthermore, this adjective] does 
not denote anything that can exist by itself or that can be organized into a 
particular or distinctive foml of existence", from "Religion Versus the 
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Religious", in A Common Faith. John Dewey (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1933), pp. 9-10, italics mine. 
iii In this paper, I will assume the most basic function underlying all 
religions is mystical states. Therefore, when I say something is a 
mystical experience, it should be kept in mind that this function is 
common to religious experience in a variety of religions. Thus, 
combining this with the aforementioned definition of 11 mystical" - a 
religious experience can indeed be "mystical", but at the same time, it 
does not hold to say all mystical experiences are of a religion. 
iv "Whether my treahnent of mystical states will shed more light or 
darkness, I do not know, for my own constitution shuts me out from 
their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of them only at second 
hand" (VRE 413). 
v "[In preparing the Varieties], the problem I have set myself is a hard 
one: first, to defend (against all prejudices of my c1asstexperience" and 
"philosophy" as being the real backbone of the world's religious life - I 
mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and 
privately felt, as against high and noble general views of our destiny 
and the world's meaning; and second, to make the hearer or reader 
believe, as I myself do invincibly believe, that, although all the special 
manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and 
theories), [ ... ] the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important 
function. A task well-nigh impossible, [ ... ] but to attempt it is tny 
religious act." From Lellers ofWilliam James, Vol II, p. 127. To Miss 
Frances R. Morse. 
vi I should like to distinguish for purposes of this essay that there) llre 
two lJ{lsic types of mystical religious experience. First is the COllll1IU/Ull 
type, a form common in Christianity. In this experience we reel there if; 
a providential God about us that hears our prnyers, and works with tiS 
continually in our life. Second, and the type which will be discussed in 
this essay, there is the kind that involves a union with the divine, and is 
perhaps so powerful that one loses all self-identity. This latter type is 
the one that James focuses on most in his Varieties. For a more elaborate 
expansion on this distinction of "communal" and "union" mystical 
experience, see David Stewart's "Mystical Experience", in Exploring the 
Philosophy afReligion. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1992) pp.S-9. 
vii This conscious relation is further advanced by his idea that" the 
relations of continuous transition experienced are what make Ollt' 
experiences cognitive" (WJ 213, italics mine). 
viii Perhaps James draws this description of reality from influences by 
Peirce and his theory of probability that deals with the pragmatic 
maxim and its applications to hardness, weight, force, and reality in his 
essay "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." More specifically, Peirce writes: 
"the will be's, the actually is's, and the have beens are not the sun, of the 
reals. They only cover actuality. They me besides would be's and can be's 
that are real", in H.S. Thayer's Meaning and Action: A Critical History of 
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Pragmatism (Babbs-Merrill: Indianapo~is and New York, 1968) p.114. 
ix "The relations that connect experiences must themselves be 
experienced relations, and any kind of relation must be accounted as 
'real' as anything else in the system." From A World ofPure Experience 
(WJ195). Also in another place, "Experience as a whole is a process in 
time, whereby innumerable particular terms lapse and are superseded 
by others that follow upon them by transitions which, whether 
disjunctive or conjunctive in content, are themselves experiences, and 
must in general be accounted at least as real as the terms which they 
relate" (McDermott 202). 
x /IAs a rule, mystical states merely add a supersensLlous meaning to the 
ordinary outward data of consciousness. They are excitements like the 
emotions of love or ambition, gifts to our spirit by means of which facts 
already objectively before us fall into a new expressiveness and make a 
new connection with our active life." (VRE 466) 
,i A similar passage in Varieties reads: "Both thought and feeling are 
determinants of conduct, and the same may be determined either by 
feeling or by thought" (VRE 548). 
xii Although in Varieties he that mystical states of religious 
experience encourage monistic tendencies, James thinks that this is 
unfortunate. The probl~m he sees with monism is its "fixed" and 
"static" nature that will not accept a "cholera-germ" of imperfection in 
its water-tank. However, because the idea of monism encourages the 
notion that we have already "reached the end" of inquiry, it cannot 
provide a sufficient account of experience in totality, given thl! "flux" Df 
knowledge is in constant transition. 
Thus, pragmatism rejects absolute monism (1' 74), and openly embracml 
pluralism, because "for men in practical life, perfection is still something far 
off and in the process of achievement" (P 16) We mllst take (l mdioristic 
approach to knowledge; that is, accepting that our current beliefs are open 
to falsification, and that reformulation of them inevitably results in new 
ideas intertwined and tainted with hints of the old. 
xiii It should be noted that James held Pragmatism and Radical Empiri­
cism to be separate doctrines (McDern1ott 314). But I am emphasizing 
the most pertinent threads in both so as to give light to discussion of 
what he meant by mystical experience, and set ttp the case for amplify­
ing his views in what I am going to call "pluralistic knowledge", 
xlv The subjective and pluralistic characteristics inherent to mystical 
experience may be reason too, why Peirce (who wasmnthematically 
and scientifically inclined) chose to leave the psychological find 
emotional elements out of his pragmatism, and perhaps why he 
responded to James negatively. 
xv "111e whole system of experience as they are immediately given presents 
itself as a quasi-chaos thmugh which one can pass out of an inilial tenn in 
many directions and yet end in the same terminus, moving from next to 
next by a gl'eat many possible paths" (McDermott 204). 
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There is also an interesting and rather long example of this type of 
pluralism in the New Testament regarding the church body: "TI1e body 
is a unit, though it is made up of many parts; and though all its parts 
are many, they form one body. [ ... J lithe foot should say, because I am 
not a hand, I do not belong to the body, it would not for that reason 
cease to be a part of the body. If the whole body were an eye, where 
would the sense of hearing be? If the whole body were an ear, where 
would the sense of smell be? But in fact God has arranged the parts in 
the body, everyone of them, just as he wanted them to be." I 
Corinthians 12:12-20 (NIV). 
On another note, in Hindu scripture an interesting pluralism is 
found with the creation of the caste system and where the making of 
humanity is presented. The particular passage that follows formed the 
basis and foundational authority for the Hindu caste system: "When 
they [the gods] divided the Man, into how many parts did they 
apportion him? What do they call his two arms and thighs and feet? 
His mouth became the Brahmin; his arms were made into the Warrior, 
his thighs the People, and from his feet the Servants were born": Rig­
Veda 10.90. 
xvi Although how we ever became aware of the content of a subject in 
the first place has been problematic from the beginning of western 
philosophy. In Plato's Mella this paradox states that we cannot seek 
what we know because we already know it, and thus do not need to 
seek for it; and we cannot search for what we do not know without 
some criterion to identify the thing with. I do not wish to solve this 
dilemma in my essay however, but assume that we are able to get past 
this stage somehow in knowledge, and I think this claim is inductively 
plausible. Ed. John M. Cooper, from Meno, in Plato's Complete Works 
(Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1997) 80D-E. 
xvii The problem of whether one can know that either they or another 
possess knowledge of something with only second order knowledge 
(Le., knowledge-of-knowledge, as opposed to first order, or knowledge 
of the content) is dealt with extensively by Plato in his Channides. I 
agree with Plato scholar Charles H. Kahn, that having "knowledge-of" 
something implies we have a degree of the content, and hence, second 
order knowledge is a degree of first order knowledge. He argues, 
"Without knowing quantum mechanics I can know enough about 
quantum mechanics to know that I am ignorant of it. Of course I must 
know something about it besides the name, or I could not be sure of my 
ignorance; I cannot be wholly ignorant of the subject./I From 
"Charmides ffil.d The Search for Beneficial Knowledge", in Plato and The 
Socratic Dialogue (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
pp.198-99. 
xviii I am broadening James's definition of "mystical" a bit, but my goal 
is to try and show the similarities of feelings to any object, to feelings 
towards a supersensible object. This is something I feel James 
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unwarrantedly neglected. In doing so, I hope to show that even if one 
claims to not have had an experience called mystical- they may avoid a 
horn in the dilemma of Meno's paradox because they do already know 
how to identify another's mystical experience because they already 
have a small degree of the content of it. 
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